Abstract-Watermarking has become a technology of choice for a broad range of multimedia copyright protection applications. Watermarks have also been used to embed formatindependent metadata in audio/video signals, in a way that is robust to common editing. In this paper, we present several novel mechanisms for effective encoding and detection of directsequence spread-spectrum watermarks in audio signals. The developed techniques aim at: (i) improving detection convergence and robustness (ii) improving watermark imperceptiveness, (iii) preventing de-synchronization attacks, (iv) alleviating estimation/removal attacks, and finally, (v) establishing covert communication over a public audio channel. We explore the security implications of the developed mechanisms and review watermark robustness on a benchmark suite that includes a combination of audio processing primitives including: time-and frequencyscaling with wow-and-flutter, additive and multiplicative noise, resampling, requantization, noise reduction, and filtering.
techniques explore the fact that the HAS is insensitive to small amplitude changes, either in the time [4] or frequency [5] , [6] , [7] domains, as well as insertion of low-amplitude timedomain echoes [8] . Information modulation is usually carried out using: SS [9] or quantization index modulation (QIM) [10] . The main advantage of both SS and QIM is that WM detection does not require the original recording, and that it is difficult to extract the hidden data using optimal statistical analysis under certain conditions [11] .
However, it is important to review the disadvantages that both technologies exhibit. First, the marked signal and the WM have to be perfectly synchronized at WM detection. Next, to achieve a sufficiently small error probability, WM length may need to be quite large, increasing detection complexity and delay. Finally, the most significant deficiency of both schemes is that by breaking a single player (debugging, reverse engineering, or the sensitivity attack [12] ), one can extract the secret information (the SS sequence or the hidden quantizers in QIM) and recreate the original (in the case of SS) or create a new copy that induces the QIM detector to identify the attacked content as unmarked. While an effective mechanism for enabling asymmetric SS watermarking has been developed [2] , an equivalent system for QIM does not exist to date.
B. Techniques for SS Watermarking of Audio
In this paper, we restrict our attention to direct-sequence SS WMs and develop a set of technologies to improve the effectiveness of their embedding and detecting in audio. WM robustness is enabled using: (i) block repetition coding for prevention against de-synchronization attacks [13] and (ii) psycho-acoustic frequency masking (PAFM). We show that PAFM creates an imbalance in the number of positive and negative WM chips in the part of the SS sequence that is used for WM correlation detection and that corresponds to the audible part of the frequency spectrum. To compensate for this anomaly, we propose a (iii) modified covariance test. In addition, to improve reliability of WM detection, we propose two techniques for reducing the variance of the correlation test: (iv) cepstrum filtering and (v) chess WMs. Since we embed SS WMs in the frequency domain, the energy of a WM is distributed throughout the entire synthesis block, making SS WMs audible in blocks that contain quiet periods. We solve this problem using (vi) a procedure that identifies blocks where SS WM may be audible, to decide whether to use a particular block in the WM embedding/detection process. Finally, we propose (vii) a technique that enables reliable covert communication over a public audio channel.
In order to investigate the security of SS WMs, we explore the robustness of such a technology with respect to watermark estimation attacks [2] . To launch that attack, an adversary is assumed to know all the details of the WM codec, except the hidden secret. We present a modification to the traditional SS WM detector that (viii) undoes the attack, and hence forces the adversary to add an amount of noise proportional in amplitude to the recorded signal, in order to successfully remove a SS WM.
We have incorporated these techniques (i-viii) into a system capable of reliably detecting a WM in an audio clip that has been modified using a composition of attacks that degrade the original audio characteristics beyond the limit of acceptable quality. Such attacks include: fluctuating scaling in the time and frequency domain, compression, addition and multiplication of noise, resampling, requantization, normalization, filtering, and random cutting and pasting of signal samples.
In Section II we review the basic aspects of SS watermarking, and in Section III we describe the specifics for audio WM. We consider the overal security aspects in Section IV, and present final remarks in Section V.
II. BASICS OF SPREAD-SPECTRUM WATERMARKING
The media signal to be watermarked x ∈ R N can be modeled as a random vector, where the elements x i are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables, with standard deviation σ x , i.e. x i ∼ N (0, σ x ).
1 Because x actually represents a collection of blocks of samples from an appropriate invertible transformation on the original audio signal [5] , [7] , [9] , such modeling is arguable and is further discussed in Section V. A watermark is defined as a direct SS sequence w, which is a vector pseudo-randomly generated in w ∈ {±1} N . Each element w i is usually called a "chip." WM chips are generated such that they are mutually independent with respect to the original recording x. The marked signal y is created by y = x+δw, where δ is the WM amplitude. The signal variance σ 2 x directly impacts the security of the scheme: the higher the variance, the more securely information can be hidden in the signal. Similarly, higher δ yields more reliable detection, less security, and potential WM audibility.
Let p · q denote the normalized inner product of vectors p and q, i.e.
For example, for w as defined above, we have w 2 = 1. A WM w is detected by correlating (or matched filtering) a given signal vector z with w:
Under no malicious attacks or other signal modifications, if the signal z has been marked, then
The detector decides that a WM is present if C(z, w) > τ , where τ is a detection threshold that controls the tradeoff between the probabilities of false positive and false negative decisions. We recall from modulation and detection theory that under the condition that x and w are i.i.d. signals, such a detector is optimal [14] . The probability P F A of a false positive detection (false alarm) is
1 N (a, b) denotes a Gaussian with mean a and variance b 2 .
and the probability P M D of a false negative detection (misdetection) is
Straightforward application of the principles above provides neither reliability nor robustness. In the following subsections, we outline the deficiencies of the basic SS WM paradigm and provide solutions for improved WM robustness, detection reliability, and resilience to certain powerful attacks.
III. HIDING SPREAD-SPECTRUM SEQUENCES IN AUDIO SIGNALS
In our watermarking system, the vector x is composed of magnitudes of several frames of a modulated complex lapped transform (MCLT) [15] in a decibel (dB) scale. The MCLT is a 2×-oversampled filter bank that provides perfect reconstruction. The MCLT is similar to a DFT filter bank, but it has properties that makes it attractive for audio processing, especially when integrating with compression systems, because signals can easily be reconstructed from just the real part of the MCLT [15] . After addition of the WM, we generate the time-domain marked audio signal by combining the vector y = x + δw with the original phase of x, and passing these modified frames to the inverse MCLT. Fig. 1 illustrates this process on an example time-domain frame. Typically, WM amplitude δ is set to a fixed value in the range 0.5-2.5 dB. For example, for δ = 1.5 dB, trained ears cannot statistically pass a distinction test between watermarked and original content, for a benchmark suite consisting of pop, rock, jazz, classical, instrument solo, and vocals musical pieces. For the typical 44.1kHz sampling, we use a length-2048 MCLT. Only the coefficients within 200 Hz-2 kHz are marked, and only the audible magnitudes in the same subband are considered during detection. Sub-band selection aims at minimizing carrier noise effects as well as sensitivity to downsampling and compression.
A. Psycho-Acoustic Frequency Masking: Consequences and Remedies
The WM detector should correlate only the audible frequency magnitudes with the WM [7] , because the inaudible portions of the frequency spectrum are significantly more susceptible to attack noise. That reduces the effective watermark length, because the inaudible portion often dominates the frequency spectrum of an audio signal [6] . In order to quantify the audibility of a particular frequency component, we use a simple PAFM model [16] . For each MCLT magnitude coefficient, the likelihood that it is audible averages 0.6 in the crucial 200 Hz-2 kHz subband, in our audio benchmark suite. Fig. 2 illustrates the frequency spectrum of an MCLT block as well as the PAFM boundary. PAFM filtering introduces the problem of SS sequence imbalance; a problem also illustrated in Fig. 2 . When embedding a positive chip (w i = +1), an inaudible frequency magnitude x i becomes audible if x i > ϑ(x i ) − δ, where ϑ(·) returns the level of audibility for the argument magnitude for a given MCLT block. Similarly, when embedding a negative chip (w i = −1), an audible magnitude becomes inaudible if x i < ϑ(x i )+δ. We define R A , R + , and R − as the ratios of frequency magnitudes that fall within the corresponding ranges
The expectation for the relative difference ξ in the number of positive and negative chips in the correlated audible part of the SS sequence equals
Asymmetric distribution of positive and negative chips in the masked SS sequence can drastically influence the convergence of the correlation test in (1). The convergence is affected because the expected value of the correlation test E[y · w] has an additional component proportional to ξ. For our benchmark suite, ξ averaged 0.057 at δ = 1 dB, with peak values reaching ξ ∼ 0.3 for recordings with low harmonic content. Thus, whenever PAFM is used, the normalized correlation test (1) must be replaced with a covariance test that compensates for using a non-zero-mean SS sequence. Assuming µ 1 , σ 1 and µ 0 , σ 0 are the mean and variance of the audible portion of x selected by positive and negative SS chips respectively, and signal y is watermarked, the correlation test in (1) can be rewritten as
where the noise component N (µ r , σ r ) of the detection test has a mean µ r = µ 1 − µ 0 + ξ(µ 1 + µ 0 ) and variance σ (1 − ξ) ). The mean value µ x of the part of the original signal x that corresponds to the audible part of y can be expressed as 2µ x = µ 1 + µ 0 + ξ(µ 1 − µ 0 ), whereas the mean value µ y of the audible part of y equals µ y = µ x + ϕ, where ϕ = 2ξδ if signal y is watermarked, and ϕ = 0 in the alternate case. Thus, by using a traditional covariance test
the detector would induce a mean absolute error of |µ r −µ y ξδ| to the covariance test because of the mutual dependency of x and w. Consider the following test
which results in a noise component N (µ r , σ r ) for this test equal to µ r = µ 1 + µ 0 and σ
Computation of µ r = µ 1 + µ 0 from y can be made relatively accurate as follows. First, µ 1 and µ 0 are computed as means of the audible part of the signal y selected by positive and negative chips respectively. Then, if µ 1 − µ 0 > 2δ − ε we conclude that the signal has been watermarked and compensate the test in (8) for µ 1 + µ 0 − 2δ; in the alternate case we compensate for µ 1 +µ 0 . Parameter ε is a constant equal to τ σ r which ensures low likelihood of a false alarm or misdetection through selection of τ (2, 3) .
An error of 2δ in the covariance test occurs if the original signal is bipartitioned with the SS chips such that µ 1 − µ 0 > 2δ −ε. This case can be detected at WM encoding time. Then, the encoder could signal an audio signal block as hard-tomark or it could extend the length of the WM. Such cases are exceptionally rare for relatively long SS sequences and typical music content rich in sound events. Note that the exact computation of µ 1 and µ 0 would also resolve the error problem incurred in the original covariance test in (6) through exact computation of µ r . Thus, the two tests in (6) and (8) are comparable and involve computation of similar complexity. On super-pipelined architectures, we expect the test in (8) to have better performance via loop unfolding, as it does not use branch testing.
B. Preventing The De-Synchronization Attack
The correlation metrics from (1, 2, 3) are reliable only if the majority of detection chips are aligned with those used in marking. Thus, an adversary can attempt to de-synchronize the correlation by fluctuating time-or frequency-axis scaling within the loose bounds of acceptable sound quality. To prevent such attacks, we use a multi-test methodology that relies on block repetition coding of chips of the WM pattern.
It is important to define the degrees of freedom for timeand frequency-scaling that preserves the relative fidelity of the attacked recording with respect to the original. The HAS is much more tolerable to constant scaling rather than wow-andflutter (variations in scaling over time). Hence, we adopt the following tolerance levels, which are appropriate in practice: γ T 0.1 for constant time-scaling, γ F 0.05 for constant frequency-scaling, and scaling variance γ V 0.01 along both time and frequency.
1) Block Repetition Coding:
In the first step, we provide resilience against fluctuations in playtime and pitch bending (wow-and-flutter) of up to a fixed parameter γ V , which delimits the maximum fluctuation magnitude independently along any of these two dimensions. As common standard values for wow-and-flutter for modern turntables are significantly below 0.01, we adopt this value as our robustness limit.
We represent a SS sequence as a matrix of chips W = {w ij }, i = 1..N F , j = 1..N T , where N F is the number of chips per MCLT block and N T is the number of blocks of N F chips per WM. Within a single MCLT block, each chip w ij is spread over a sub-band of F i consecutive MCLT coefficients. Chips embedded in a single MCLT block are then replicated along the time axis within consecutive T j MCLT blocks. An example of how redundancies are generated is illustrated in Fig. 3 (with fixed parameters F i = 3, T j = 3 for all i and j). Widths of the encoding regions F i , i = 1..N F are computed using a geometric progression
3. An example of block repetition coding along the time and frequency domain of an audio clip. Each block is encoded with the same bit, whereas the detector integrates only the center locations of each region.
where η F is the width of the decoding region (central to the encoding region) along the frequency. Similarly, the length of
MCLT blocks watermarked with the same SS chip block is delimited by: It is straightforward to prove that such generation of encoding and decoding regions guarantees that regardless of induced wow-and-flutter limited to γ V , the correlation test is performed in perfect synchronization. Typical redundancy parameters are: (i) constant replication along time axis 5-10 MCLT blocks and (ii) geometrically progressed replication along the frequency axis is such that typically 50-120 chips are embedded within the target sub-band 200-2 kHz.
2) Multiple Correlation Tests:
The adversary can combine wow-and-flutter with a stronger constant scaling in time and frequency. Constant scaling of up to γ T < 0.1 along the time axis and γ F < 0.05 along the frequency axis can be performed on an audio clip with good fidelity with respect to the original recording. Resilience to static time-and pitchscaling is obtained by performing multiple correlation tests as follows:
length in MCLT blocks 2 load buffer with MCLT coefficients from progress consecutive MCLT blocks starting from the MCLT block indexed with pointer 3 for time.scaling = −γ T to +γ T step γ V /2 and for frequency.scaling = −γ F to +γ F step γ V /2, correlate buffer with WM scaled according to time.scaling and frequency.scaling 
, is compared to the detection threshold τ to determine WM presence. If WM is found, the entire buffer is reloaded with new MCLT coefficients. Otherwise, the content of the buffer is shifted for λ MCLT blocks and a new set of tests is performed.
In a typical implementation, for γ V = 0.02, in order to cover γ T = 0.1 and γ F = 0.05, the WM detector computes 105 different correlation tests. The search step along the time axis denoted as λ typically equals between one and four MCLT blocks. An example is shown in Fig. 4 . Note that the main incentive for providing such a mechanism to enable synchronization is the fact that, within the length of the WM, the adversary really cannot move away from the selected constant time and frequency scaling more than γ V /2; such a change would induce intolerable sound quality. If the attacker is within the assumed attack bounds, the described mechanism enables the detector to conclude whether there is a WM or not in the audio clip based on the SS statistics from (1) and regardless of the presence of the attack.
C. Cepstrum Filtering
The variance σ 2 x of the original signal directly affects the carrier noise in (1) . Audio clips with large energy fluctuations or with strong harmonics are especially bound to produce large σ x . Thus, we propose here a nonlinear processing step to reduce the carrier noise. One approach is to subtract a moving average from the frequency spectrum right before correlation; a sort of whitening step. Unfortunately, as bits of the SS sequence are spread over frequency ranges, this technique induces partial removal of the WM chips. We have developed a cepstrum filtering (CF) technique that produces significantly better results than just spectral whitening. With CF we reduce σ y in (1) through the following steps:
1 z = DCT{y} -compute the cepstrum of the dB magnitude MCLT vector y under test via the discrete cosine transform 2 z i = 0, i = 1..K -filter out the first K (typically 5 < K < 20) cepstrum coefficients 3 y = IDCT{z} -reconstruct the frequency spectrum via an inverse DCT. The filtered frequency spectrum replaces y in the correlation detector (1) The rationale behind CF is that large variations in y can only come from large variations in x, since |w| is limited to a small value δ σ x . Thus, by filtering out large variations in y we can reduce the carrier noise significantly, without affecting much the expected value E[y · w]. That is particularly efficient if the WM sequence w has a non-white spectrum containing more noise at higher frequencies, as discussed in the next subsection. Fig. 5 illustrates the impact of CF on the signal variance, which is typically reduced by a factor of almost four. Thus, in order to attain the performance of CF detector, a non-CF detector must integrate almost four times more magnitude points.
D. Chess Watermarks
Because of the relatively short MCLT frames (30ms), we assume that the audio signal has a slowly-varying magnitude spectrum. Thus, for short WMs, a possible sequence in time of several consecutive positive WM chips can pose false alarms if correlated with large positive x values. In practice, that problem occurs frequently for quiet clips with strong harmonics (e.g. piano or sax solo). To alleviate the problem, it is important to attenuate the DC component of the WM chips along the time direction.
We define a perfect WM (PW) as a sequence of alternating positive and negative chips, along both the time and frequency axis. Correlation with PW results in highly improved correlation convergence for a non-watermarked signal, as illustrated in Fig. 6 . To leverage the convergence efficacy of PW with the security of pseudo-random SS sequences, we introduce a chess-WM (CW). We define a CW as a stochastic approximation to a PW, by using the simple first-order state machine depicted in Fig. 6 . Whereas the probability p of switching from the "0" state to the "1" state for traditional SS sequences is desired to be one-half, we built CWs to enforce frequent toggling of bits along the time axis or, equivalently, to emphasize high frequencies in the WM sequence. We typically select p = 0.75. For a sufficiently large N , the randomness reduction in the sequence domain does not pose a security threat, while resulting in correlation convergence similar to PW (typically N > 200).
E. Improving The Inaudibility of Spread-Spectrum Watermarks in Audio SS WMs can be audible when embedded in the MCLT domain even at low magnitudes (e.g. δ < 1 dB). This can happen in blocks where certain parts (up to 10ms) are quiet, whereas the remainder of the block is rich in audio energy. Since the SS sequence spreads over the entire MCLT block, it can cause audible noise in the quiet portion of the MCLT block (see Fig. 7 ).
To alleviate that problem, we detect MCLT blocks with dynamic content where a SS WM may be audible if added. The blocks are identified according to an energy criterium, for example, as descried below. WMs are not embedded nor detected in such blocks. Fortunately, such blocks do not occur often in audio content; in our benchmark set we identified up to ζ < 5% of MCLT blocks per WM as potential hazard for audibility. By not marking these blocks, the corresponding correlation is bound to a lower expected value E[y·w] = 1−ζ], which causes only a minor effect on detector's decision. The detection of hazardous blocks is performed on each length-K MCLT block using the following algorithm: 1 Compute the interval energy level
.P for each of the P interleaved subintervals of the tested signal y in the time-domain (commonly K/P 32). Block subintervals are illustrated in Fig. 7 . 
χ 0 then WM is audible in the block. Parameter χ 0 is empirically determined.
F. Covert Communication Over Audio Channels
SS provides only means of embedding (hiding) pseudorandom bit sequences into a given signal carrier (audio clip). One trivial way to embed an arbitrary message into a SS sequence is to use a pool of WMs such that each WM represents a symbol from an alphabet used to create the covert message. Depending on the symbol to be sent, the encoder selects one of the WMs from the pool and marks the next consecutive part of audio with this WM. The detector tries all WMs from the pool and if any of the correlation tests yields a positive test, it concludes that the word that corresponds to the detected WM has been sent. Since a typical WM length in our implementation ranges from 11 to 22 seconds, to achieve a covert channel capacity of just 1bps (bit per second) the detector is expected to perform between 210 and 221 different WM tests. Besides being computationally expensive, this technique also raises the likelihood of a false alarm or misdetection by several orders of magnitude. Therefore, it is clear that a covert channel cannot rely solely on WM multiplicity, and thus some form of WM modulation must be considered. A basic concept for the design of a modulation scheme is the observation that if we multiply all WM chips by −1, the normalized correlation changes sign, but not magnitude. Therefore, the correlation test can detect the WM by the magnitude of the correlation, and the sign carries one bit of information.
The covert communication channel that we have designed uses two additional ideas. First, to add S message bits, the SS sequence is partitioned along the time-axis into S equallength subsets w k , k = 1..S, where each w k consists of all WM chips w ij such that (k − 1)S j < kS. Thus, there are N T /S chip blocks of N F chips per each w k . Each bit b k of a message B ∈ {±1} S is used to multiply the chips of the corresponding w k while creating the marked content:
where y k and x k are content blocks that correspond to w k . A typical example is shown in Fig. 8 . At detection time, the squared value of each partial covariance test C(y k , w k ) -computed using (1) -is accumulated to create the final test value as follows:
Therefore, C(y, w) in this case has three components: (i) a mean and (ii) a zero-mean Gaussian random variable (both of them equal to zero if the content is not marked) and (iii) a sum of squares of Gaussian random variables. Thus, the likelihood of a false alarm P F A (2) can be computed using the upper tail of the chi-squared pdf with S degrees of freedom:
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function. The lower bound on the likelihood of a WM misdetection is computed according to (3) as the third component in (10) can be neglected for marked signals, because it is always positive. Bits of the covert message are recovered at detection time as the sign of partial correlations b k = sign(C(y k , w k )). The likelihood of a bit misdetection P M DB once a WM is detected equals
Finally, in order to improve the robustness of each bit of the encoded covert message, we perform a secret permutation π(i) of the message bits for each MCLT subband F i . Thus, a permuted bit b π(i,k) is combined with chip blocks along a certain subband w ik , k = 1..S (each block has N T /S chips) and then embedded in the original content as:
. This procedure aims at (i) spreading each bit of the encoded covert message throughout the entire WM for security reasons (an attacker cannot focus only on a short part of the clip hoping to remove the message bit) and (ii) increasing the robustness of the detection algorithm because of spreading localized variances of noise over the entire length of a WM. The process of permuting bits of the message is illustrated in Fig. 8 .
G. Summarizing Discussion
We have deployed the techniques described in the previous subsections, to create an audio watermarking system with strong robustness with respect to common audio editing procedures. A block diagram that illustrates how the developed technologies are linked into a cohesive system for audio marking is presented in Fig. 9 . A reference implementation of our data hiding technology on an x86 platform requires 32 Kbytes of memory for code and 100 Kbytes for the data buffer. The data buffer stores averaged MCLT blocks of 12.1 seconds of audio (for a WM length of 11 seconds). WMs are searched with γ V = 0.02, which requires ∼ 40 tests per search point. Real-time WM detection under these circumstances requires about 15 MIPS, a small requirement for today's DSP processors. WM encoding is an order of magnitude faster, with smaller memory footprints. The achieved covert channel bit rate varies in the range of 0.5 − 1 bps, for S = 4 and a pool of 16 different WMs.
We have tested our proposed watermarking technology using a composition of common sound editing tools and malicious attacks, including all tests defined by the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) industry committee [17] . Such tests included double D/A-A/D conversion, noise addition at −36 dB level, bandpass filtering, MP3 encoding at 64 and 32 kbps, time-scale changing of up to ±4%, wow and flutter at 0.5%, and echo insertion of up to 100 ms. We used a data set of eighty 15-sec audio clips, which included: jazz, classical, voice, pop, instrument solos (accordion, piano, guitar, sax, etc.), and rock. In that data set, there were no errors, and from measured noise levels in the correlation metric, we estimated the error probability to be well below 10 −6 . Error probabilities decrease exponentially fast with the increase of WM length, so it is relatively easy to design a system for error probabilities below 10 −9 , for example. Analysis of the security of embedded WMs is presented in the next section. Fig. 10 shows the performance improvements, with the modifications described above, on our benchmark set (concatenated into a single sound clip on these diagrams): (a,b) vs. (c,d) demonstrates strong gain in C(y, w) variance due to cepstrum filtering; and (e,f) vs. (g,h) showcases slightly reduced detection reliability due to the permuted covert communication (PCC) channel. Peaks in the correlation test clearly indicate detection and location of each WM. Note that the peak values for both detectors are virtually the same, however, the negative detection for the PCC decoder yields slightly higher variance (in our experiments we recorded differences up to 5%).
Finally, in order to quantify the robustness of the watermarking technology with respect to a publicly available benchmark, we show the watermark detection results against the attacks in Stirmark Audio [18] . For that experiment, we have selected an audio clip rich in music events (a rhythmic latin jazz clip with trombone, piano and alt-sax solos), watermarked it, and then detected watermarks in the original, the marked copy, and all 46 clips created by the Stirmark Audio suite of attacks. The detection results are presented in Table I . For watermarked clips, we report the minimal correlation achieved for each of the 10 watermarks embedded in the audio clip. For the original clip, we report the maximal correlation value throughout the search for any of the 10 watermarks. The corresponding correlation value is marked as C(y, w) in Table  I . The detection threshold is set to τ = 0.25, which results in an estimated probability of a false positive smaller than 10
for a variety of audio clips. From Table I , we observe that all but one attack had only minimal effect on the correlation value. The only attack that reduced significantly the correlation value (copysample), had a strong impact on the fidelity of the recording, so that the attacked clip almost did not resemble the original. The parameters of the Stirmark Audio attack were the same as the ones included in the version of the tool available on the Web [18] .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now evaluate the security of our watermarking mechanisms with respect to the watermark estimation attack. As discussed in the previous Section, we introduced block repetition codes and multiple correlation tests to enforce synchronization for attacks with limited variable scaling. So, in improving robustness against signal deformation attacks, we introduced a certain amount of redundancy in the watermarking pattern. That improves the chances that an attacker can estimate the WM chips from the marked signal [19] . Thus, we need to quantify the efficiency of such attacks and devise new mechanisms to protect against them.
In order to simplify the formal description of block repetition codes in our audio WM codec, we now modify slightly our notation. The marked signal y is created by adding the WM with certain magnitude δ to the original:
Vectors y and x have N = m × n samples, whereas w has n chips, each of them replicated successively m times. The WM detector correlates the averages of the central m o elements of each region marked with the same chip, where
. Such a detector can tolerate fluctuation in content scaling up to (k−1)m/2k signal coefficients [20] . The involved block repetition code improves the detection, but it also improves the efficacy of the estimation attack. If all details of the embedder are known (except w), the adversary can compute the WM estimate, amplify it with a factor α > 1, and then subtract the amplified attack vector from the marked content [2] .
Theorem 1: Given a set of m samples of x, marked with the same chip w i such that:
the optimal estimate v i of the hidden WM chip w i is given by
See Lemma 1 in [2] for proof. Note that v ∈ {±1} N . Theorem 2: The optimal WM estimation as presented in Theorem 1, yields the following probability of estimation error per WM chip:
See Corollary 1 in [2] for proof. The estimation attack is performed by subtracting an amplified WM estimate αv from the marked content y:
The maximum value of the amplification factor α depends solely on the desired level of audibility for the attack. In practice, α can be much greater than δ, because the content marking entity is subject to much more stringent content fidelity constraints than an attacker.
z of the attacked signal depends on α as presented: Proof: (sketch) By replacing (y i − αv i ) in (18) with
which proves (18) to be correct. Corollary 2: After the attack, the expected correlation value computed by the WM detector equals From (20) we compute that, in order to draw the expected correlation value to E[z · w] = θ, the attacker has to induce α(θ) equal to:
If v = w or α = δ, the estimation attack adds noise to the marked signal. Part of this noise is an accurate estimate of the WM and it actually reverses the effect of the watermarking process. The remainder of the attack vector is applied in addition to the existing marked data.
Corollary 3:
The estimation attack on a marked content described in (17) induces the following additive noise with respect to the original signal
whereas the added noise with respect to the marked copy equals: Criterion 2: An attack with fixed α(θ) draws the expected value of the correlation to a value E[z · w] = θ. For a fixed WM length n and detection decision threshold τ = θ/2 that achieves symmetric probability of false alarm P F A and misdetection P M D , the detection error probability P E = P F A = P M D is upper bounded by at most γ:
It is important to stress that the efficiency of SS watermarking and detection depends by and large upon the parameters that are content dependent.
Problem 1: For a given σ x , what is the optimal value of δ such that under the optimal estimation attack described in (17) and quantified using α, maximal N/O is induced while Criterion 2 is satisfied?
The posed problem can be solved in two steps. 1) From Criterion 2, we can compute the minimal expected value for the normalized correlation E[z · w] ≥ θ after the attack: 
from which we can numerically find the desired δ that maximizes the induced N/O. Fig. 13 illustrates the probability of a detection error P E (for τ = θ/2) with respect to a given WM length of n chips and for 
A. Undoing the Estimation Attack
In this subsection, we demonstrate a remedy for the estimation attack described in (17) . The main idea is to optimally reverse the attack, i.e. estimate the signal coefficient y i from the attacked signal z i . We also demonstrate that a slight modification to the attack in (17) succeeds in removing the WM (or disabling the detector to identify the WM) by adding additional noise to the attacked signal.
Definition 1: The undo operator U (z i , α), where z i , α ∈ R, is defined as follows:
, ,
Theorem 3: Given a signal coefficient z i created using the estimation attack as z i = y i − α sign(y i ), where y i is a weighted sum y i = x i + δw i of a Gaussian zero-mean i.i.d. variable x i and a SS sequence chip w i and α ≥ δ, optimal estimation u i of the signal y i such that E[|u i −y i |] is minimal, is given using the undo operator u i = U (z i , α).
Proof: (sketch) When doing the estimation attack, the adversary shifts the positive and negative pdf of the marked signalỹ for α against the sign of y. The undo operation described in (27) retrieves all values of the original signal y: Corollary 4: The expected value for the correlation of the recovered u and w is given by
Proof: ( 
where f (x + c) is a function of the Gaussian distribution centered at c with variance σ 2 x , which results in (28). The detector cannot possibly know the attack amplification value α while performing the detection. However, note that
, where x is a signal which does not have w embedded. Thus, the detector can perform T tests E[U(x, α t ), w] for realistic values of α = {α t , t = 1..T } that can potentially break the system (e.g., α = {3, 4, 5}).
The power of the undo operation is based on the inequivalent distribution of magnitudes marked with positive and negative chips. Therefore, the attacker must impose additional noise n to the attacked signal z such that the latter distributions are equalized. While the "smart noise" −αv draws E[z · w] to zero, the additional noise n enables that no undo operation is able to retrieve even a small part of the original distributions of the signal marked with positive and negative chips.
A modified undo operation:
with β ∼ σ n may strengthen the detection procedure, however its effectiveness is very limited. Because of the undo operation, the estimation attack needs to be modified as follows:
where n is a noise pattern aiming to equalize the distributions of magnitudes marked with positive and negative chips. For example, white noise of amplitude σ n ∼ σ x /2 commonly creates a difficult task for the designer of an undo operation.
V. FINAL REMARKS
We now consider three key aspects of SS-based audio watermarking.
A. Justifying the Gaussian assumption
The linear marking (13) and detection (Corollary 4) process is performed on the audible, averaged, and cepstrum-filtered coefficients of a 2048-long MCLT analysis window [15] in the logarithmic (dB) domain. We have observed that on a great variety of audio clips, even the individual filtered coefficients can be accurately modeled using a Gaussian PDF. In addition, the detector averages the central m o coefficients in each repetition block, which significantly improves the modeling accuracy due to the Central Limit Theorem. Thus, the final working vector y extracted from the audio clip can be highly accurately macromodeled as a Gaussian vector. Local correlations and nonstationarity are effectively cancelled using sufficiently large windows (1024+ window size at a sampling frequency of 44.1kHz), cepstrum filtering, and running-average windowing along the time-axis.
B. How does redundancy impact detector and estimator performance on real-life data?
The reliability of detection as well as the performance of the WM estimator depend upon the variance of the original working vector x. Fig. 16 illustrates the standard deviation σ E = σ x / √ m that the estimator sees, assuming it knows perfectly the location of the WM and the standard deviation σ D = σ x / √ m o that the detector sees while computing the correlation test. Block repetition assumed in this case is m = 5 × 9 coefficients along the frequency and time axis respectively. The corresponding region for detection is m o = 3 × 5 coefficients. According to Fig. 16 , we locate the WM to the 200-2 kHz region for three reasons. First, HAS is much more sensitive to noise in this sub-band (a noise of only 4 dB can rarely be tolerated). Second, the variance of the carrier signal is higher in this region providing a more robust host for data hiding with respect to the estimation attack. Third, although the ratio m/m o = √ 3, in the proposed subband, the actual σ E /σ D retrieved experimentally from over 100 audio clips is only 1.18.
C. What is the impact of the results obtained so far on audio watermarking?
We have presented a generic recipe for using SS WMs to hide secrets in multimedia content. For a typical music content, if the SS WM is located in the 200 Hz-2 kHz sub-band, in order to draw the correlation of the new undo correlation test to a value that forces detection failure, the adversary needs to add total noise in the excess of 6 dB, which may be intolerable to many users. SS WM length that would enable false alarm accuracy of P F A ≈ 10 −6 would require approximately an 80-second music frame. A WM of such length is difficult to synchronize at the detector. Although block repetition codes enable wow-and-flutter tolerance required for most low-end turntables (e.g. 0.15 % playtime fluctuation), it is arguable whether a common HAS would discard such content as of no value.
On the other hand, techniques presented in this paper may provide better results for data hiding in video signals, as we estimate that per frame significantly more chips can be embedded resulting in shorter watermarks, i.e. higher robustness to frame dropping and limited geometric distortions.
